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A B S T R A C T
Is the sense of smell a source of aesthetic perception? Traditional philosophical aesthetics has centered on vision and audition but eliminated smell for its sub-
jective and inherently affective character. This article dismantles the myth that olfaction is an unsophisticated sense. It makes a case for olfactory aesthetics by
integrating recent insights in neuroscience with traditional expertise about flavor and fragrance assessment in perfumery and wine tasting. My analysis concerns
the importance of observational refinement in aesthetic experience. I argue that the active engagement with stimulus features in perceptual processing shapes the
phenomenological content, so much so that the perceptual structure of trained smelling varies significantly from naive smelling. In a second step, I interpret the
processes that determine such perceptual refinement in the context of neural decision-making processes, and I end with a positive outlook on how research in
neuroscience can be used to benefit philosophical aesthetics.
© 2016 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
1. Introduction: aesthetic perception as observational refinement
Is the sense of smell a subject for aesthetic theorizing? Orthodox
ideas about aesthetics focus on visual and auditory objects, where
philosophical interest in aesthetic values concerns the sophisticated
structure of aesthetic experience (Carroll, 2001). These debates aim
at a measure of objectivity for aesthetic judgment by asserting fath-
omable features in the objects of perception, such as harmony in mu-
sic or proportion in paintings or sculptures. Olfaction has been almost
univocally excluded in this context, in particular for its inherently af-
fective nature. Odors are seen as lacking a sufficiently objective basis
as well as a structural differentiation in their perceptual content that is
required for their cognitive appraisal in an aesthetic sense. Nonethe-
less, the dismissal of smell in aesthetic studies is striking, especially
given the rich history of olfactory and aromatic artifacts such as per-
fumes, whiskey, or wine (Classen, Howes, & Synnott, 1994).
This article integrates the undervalued topic of odor perception into
the general debate about aesthetics. The central point concerns the im-
portance of refinement for aesthetic experience as an active engage-
ment with stimulus features in perceptual processing. Drawing on ol-
faction, I argue that such refinement fundamentally shapes percep-
tual content, so much so that it sufficiently discerns the phenome-
nological structure of trained from naive smelling. In support of this
claim, I bring together insights from two separate domains of work
on olfaction. My analysis builds on recent research in sensory neuro-
science, showing that smell is not a brutish sensation but subject to a
range of cognitive processes (Shepherd, 2004, 2012). This scientific
understanding is complemented with traditional knowledge about fra-
grance and flavor assessment in perfumery and wine tasting (Ellena,
2012; Smith, 2007a,b; Todd, 2010). By linking scientific with arti-
sanal expertise this article aims to highlight the flexibility of percep
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tual bias as the central element through which to investigate aesthetic
experience in olfaction as an interactional process of observational re-
finement.
In a second step, I elaborate on the model of aesthetic experience as
a refinement of perception by engaging with its empirical basis. Here,
I offer an interpretation of the processes that determine such percep-
tual refinement in the context of decision-making mechanisms. Deci-
sion-making is a central component of perceptual processing and has
received growing interest in research on the neural basis of cognitive
processing (Gold & Shadlen, 2007; Shadlen & Kiani, 2013). It is fun-
damental to organismal behavior, and the underlying neural mecha-
nisms operate at several levels to facilitate the discrimination of and
attention to certain stimulus features. Decision-making, I suggest, al-
lows for a more precise framing for the cognitive processing of selec-
tive attention that we see in aesthetic perception.
Overall, the article's purpose is twofold and divided into two the-
matic parts. The first part embeds olfaction in philosophical studies of
aesthetic perception. The second parts builds on the first part's sup-
port from neuroscientific studies to offer a positive outlook on how re-
search in neuroscience can be used to benefit philosophical aesthetics.
More specifically, section 2.1 begins by identifying the reason for the
dismissal of olfaction in aesthetics, namely its apparent lack of objec-
tivity. Section 2.2 corrects the underlying misconceptions about odor
perception by drawing on recent neuroscientific studies, further com-
bining these scientific insights with traditional knowledge from per-
fumery and wine tasting. Section 2.3 analyzes the perceptual content
of smell in terms of its aesthetic dimensions. The article then moves on
to its second part and in section 3.1 frames the previously highlighted
process of perceptual refinement with regard to studies of neural deci-
sion-making. Section 3.2 concludes by briefly addressing philosophi-
cal concerns about the use of neuroscientific studies for aesthetics in
light of the emerging field of neuroaesthetics.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.newideapsych.2017.03.013
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2. Part 1: Olfactory aesthetics
2.1. Can odors be an object of aesthetic theorizing?
Can the sense of smell communicate aesthetic experiences? Tra-
dition in aesthetic studies will have you believe that it cannot. What
constitutes aesthetic perception is open to different perspectives. In
essence, aesthetic experiences are considered to have a cognitive di-
mension in the sense that they are assumed to sharpen our rational ac-
cess to the world through a sophisticated perception of particular fea-
tures or objects (Carroll, 2001). Odors are not commonly thought of as
representing the kind of sensory experience that admits of such cogni-
tive value. This exclusion of smell from aesthetic theorizing draws on
two convictions. First, olfaction is not considered to provide objective
measures of its aesthetic qualities because the objects of odor percep-
tion are not accessible independently from their subjective perceptual
experience. Rather, they are subject to individual judgment. Second,
such individual judgment about smell perception does not offer a suf-
ficiently objective basis or distinct phenomenological structure either.
In light of this, the integration of olfaction into a discussion about the
internal and external characteristics of aesthetic experiences is the first
necessary step towards an understanding of the aesthetic dimension of
smell.
To begin with, we must recognize that the strict opposition be-
tween objective and subjective experiences, which led to the general
exclusion of smell from aesthetic studies, represents an older, intellec-
tualized conceptualization of aesthetics. This conceptualization situ-
ates the grounds for aesthetic experiences as being external to the per-
ceiver (e.g., to properties of objects), and the justification for such ob-
jectivism mirrors the domain in which most aesthetic debates are held.
This domain is predominantly confined to the arts. Although, theo-
retically, objects of aesthetic experiences need not be objects of art
(Mandoki, 2007; Saito, 2015), many considerations about what consti-
tutes aesthetic perception derive from art studies (Carroll, 2001). Aes-
thetic perception in this context represents a particular form of cog-
nitive appraisal underlying the judgment of art. Central to such judg-
ment are the intellectual and potentially moral virtues of art, as found
in David Hume's aesthetics. Occasionally, this view is associated with
the idea that aesthetic appraisal is of a disinterested nature, that is
lacking in self-interest and practical wanting. Here, we sometimes en-
counter the old assumption that beauty and reason must share a com-
mon cognitive and even normative dimension, and one of the most
prominent and early advocates for this view was Immanuel Kant.1 On
the whole, the underlying idea is that aesthetic experiences are inten-
tional in the sense that they convey information about objects that is
not bound to the individual's subjective perception. Thus, aesthetic ex-
periences are about features of objects, not personal preferences.
From this perspective, smells do not present an obvious subject for
aesthetic theorizing. According to philosophical introspection, odors
do not account for objective properties of objects but appear primar-
ily as individual experiences and somewhat instinctive. Some philoso-
phers like Clare Batty (2010), therefore, refer to smells as mere phe-
nomenological ‘feels.’ Moreover, smells do not seem to pos
1 Notably, Kant explicitly dismissed olfaction from yielding any positive value or
benefitting from closer inspection: “Which organic sense is the most ungrateful
and also seems the most dispensable? The sense of smell. It does not pay to
cultivate it or to refine it at all in order to enjoy; for there are more disgusting
objects than pleasant ones (especially in crowded places), and even when we come
across something fragrant, the pleasure coming from the sense of smell is fleeting
and transient.” (Kant, 2006 [1798], pp. 50–51; italics in original).
sess sufficient cognitive content. Other philosophers, for example
William Lycan (2000), consider smells to be poor in information be-
cause they lack clear spatial dimensions such as in visual perception
(e.g., accounting for an object's position, orientation, or directness).
For these and similar reasons, smell still stands in the reputation of be-
ing a lower sense that engages in “mere physical sensation - the mind-
less 'pleasures' of the body (Classen 2001).” It shares this fate together
with the senses of touch and taste. In contrast with the ‘higher senses’
of vision and audition, which are seen as being closer to the faculty of
reason, the so-called lower senses have thus been dismissed from aes-
thetic studies based on their appeal to animal instincts. Indeed:
“The devaluation of smell in the contemporary West is directly
linked to the revaluation of the senses which took place during the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The philosophers and scien-
tists of that period decided that, while sight was the pre-eminent
sense of reason and civilization, smell was the sense of madness
and savagery. In the course of human evolution, it was argued by
Darwin, Freud and others, the sense of smell had been left behind
and that of sight had taken priority. Modern humans who empha-
sized the importance of smell were therefore judged to be either in-
sufficiently evolved savages, degenerate proletariat, or else aberra-
tions: perverts, lunatics or idiots.” (Classen et al., 1994, pp. 50–51;
italics in original)
Is such dismissal justified? Contemporary views about the human
sense of smell keep to similar sentiments. However, this understand-
ing of olfaction rests more on misconceptions than facts. In fact, we
have done research on the senses and perceptual experience a major
disservice by neglecting the sense of smell, as the human sense of
smell has not ‘been left behind.’ Neither is smell in evolutionary de-
cline nor is it cognitively insignificant. To the contrary, its importance
and processing have changed from orthonasal (inhaling) to retronasal
(mouth breathing) olfaction, a process that is fundamental to our re-
fined capacities in flavor perception (Shepherd, 2004, 2012). Our abil-
ities in flavor discrimination and their appraisal are highly cultivated,
and the development and varieties of human cuisine is one of the most
central cultural achievements (Spence & Piqueras-Fiszman, 2014).
The trade with fragrances and flavors has always been one of the
most lucrative and influential constituents of human culture. Histori-
cally, the spice trade and the ongoing hunt for new flavors have shaped
our modern socio-economic landscape (Freedman, 2007). From a con-
temporary point of view, we have become flooded with flavored and
scented products and we find an entire industry occupied with selling
fragrant and flavored products – quite successfully so. Today, 28 bil-
lion dollars are generated annually with fragrant products in the US
alone, ranging from high-end perfume to scented trash bags (Keller &
Vosshall, 2004). From a pragmatist perspective, smell and flavor, re-
garding their creation as well as masking, are central elements of hu-
man culture (Classen et al., 1994; Gilbert, 2008).
Moreover, our vocabulary for smell and flavor experiences is not
diminished either. Instead, this idea represents another misconception
(notably, one that is often cited in support for the hypothesis about the
evolutionary decline and cognitive deficiency of olfaction). As a re-
cent series of psycholinguistic and anthropological studies has demon-
strated, our limited vocabulary represents an artifact of (modern West-
ern) cultural neglect, not a fact about human biology (Majid, 2016;
Wnuk & Majid, 2014).
Therefore, to understand how olfaction admits to aesthetic expe-
rience, we must revisit its biological basis, in particular its links to
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that is involved in the assessment of fragrances and flavors. The fol-
lowing section will use these insights to reevaluate the strict distinc-
tion between perception and cognition, and to pave the way for an ob-
jectivist stance on odor perception.
2.2. Cognitive penetration in odor perception: insights from
neuroscience
How are smells processed, to which external features of objects
does odor perception relate, and can they communicate aesthetic expe-
rience? The process of smelling is an interpretation of chemical infor-
mation in the environment through our sensory system. Our nose de-
tects volatile airborne molecules and our brain makes sense of their in-
formation by turning them into smells. How does the brain make sense
of scents? The central organ of olfactory experience is indeed not the
nose but the brain. This insight is fairly recent, as research on smell be-
came part of mainstream sensory neuroscience only after the discov-
ery of the mammalian olfactory receptors by Linda Buck and Richard
Axel in 1991. That said, comprehensive scientific understanding of the
organizational principles underlying higher-level brain processing in
olfaction presents an open issue to date. In particular, the cortical rep-
resentation of odor stimuli remains unresolved. Nonetheless, over the
past 25 years, vast progress has been made in modeling the olfactory
pathway and tracing olfactory signaling (Axel, 2005; Barwich, 2015;
Firestein, 2001; Shepherd, 2006). A central realization in this context
is that olfaction involves a significant amount of top-down processing
(Chen et al., 2014; Zelano, Mohanty, & Gottfried, 2011).
These insights prove essential for philosophical interest in the aes-
thetic dimensions of odors, as it corrects the long-standing assumption
that olfaction is a brutish sensation that lacks cognitive load and so-
phistication. This opinion constituted the principal reason for the ex-
clusion of the sense of smell in aesthetic studies. Smells were judged
as unsuitable for aesthetic theorizing because they were considered
as being too subjective, meaning (i) they do not exhibit a sufficiently
cognitive dimension but represent mere feels and (ii) they are not in-
tentional (about objects) but expressed only personal preferences. No-
ticeably, this opinion is based on a strong conceptual division between
perception and cognition, a division that is a result of a predominantly
visuo-centric approach. Drawing on recent advances in olfactory neu-
roscience, the strict distinction between perception and cognition has
been challenged by a number of recent philosophical works, how-
ever (Barwich, 2016, Barwich, 2017; Keller, 2017b). Besides, even in
philosophical analysis of vision this distinction has become subject to
much scrutiny, for example in recent debates about cognitive penetra-
tion (Burnston, 2016; Macpherson, 2012).
In comparison to vision, judgment about odors is even more deeply
entwined with their perception (Keller, 2017a). A variety of top-down
processes and cognitive penetration inevitably shape odor perception.
Next to recordings of neural top-down feedback from higher corti-
cal areas (Chen et al., 2014), such effects are also well-known phe-
nomena in psychophysical research. For example, a study by Herz
and von Clef (2001) investigated the effect of verbal labeling on
smell perception. Here, subjects were asked to sniff pairs of mix-
tures, which, unbeknownst to them, had the same chemical composi-
tion but were given different evaluative names (such as “musty base-
ment” and “incense” for Patchouli). The majority of subjects (83%)
could distinguish the mixtures and further attributed different hedo-
nic tones (i.e., pleasant or unpleasant) to them. Similar effects were
observed regarding the influence of visual clues on odor (Zellner &
Kautz, 1990). What these results suggest is that the division between
sensory and cognitive processing is not as strict as previously be
lieved. Dismissal of scent in aesthetics on such grounds is, therefore,
no longer apt.
Such insight about the influence of top-down processes on olfac-
tion resonates strongly with the traditional knowledge of experts in ar-
tisanal contexts. Ignored by intellectualized aesthetic debates for cen-
turies, wine tasters and perfumers have developed considerable analyt-
ical skills and techniques for conceptually breaking down fragrances
(orthonasal) and fragrances (retronasal smell) into their individual per-
ceptual notes and components. These skills often attracted mockery
and accusations of snobbery, not least because of their sometimes ex-
cessively flamboyant style of descriptions: “when I find someone I re-
spect writing about an edgy, nervous wine that dithered in the glass, I
cringe. When I hear someone that I don't respect talk about an austere,
unforgiving wine, I turn a bit austere and unforgiving myself … You
can call a wine red, and dry, and strong and pleasant. After that, watch
out … ! (Kingsley Amis as quoted in Shapin, 2012, p. 51)”
Moving beyond the stigma of pretentious writing, scientific stud-
ies have shown that wine and perfume experts really exhibit better
discriminatory abilities when it comes to distinguishing, memoriz-
ing, and verbally characterizing fragrances and flavors (Croijmans &
Majid, 2016; Melcher & Schooler, 1996; Zucco, Carassai, Baroni, &
Stevenson, 2011). Their heightened abilities are not due to some su-
per-perceptual powers of individuals but, rather, based on an exten-
sive verbal and perceptual training that experts have diligently under-
taken over several years. Laypeople can acquire and exhibit increased
perceptual skills even after a few weeks' training also. More recent
research on the role of expertise in olfaction further elicited the un-
derlying effects of such training in terms of functional and structural
modifications in the neural processing of odors (for a review about
the impact of expertise in olfaction, see Royet, Plailly, Saive, Veyrac,
& Delon-Martin, 2013). On this account, the expertise of wine tasters
and perfumers constitutes a form of trained and specialized perception
that builds on the same neural processes as normal perception. In turn,
our investigation of aesthetic perception in olfaction has changed: We
must not ask any longer whether olfaction can communicate aesthetic
experience, but when and under what conditions.
2.3. The structure of olfactory perception and its aesthetic
dimensions
What is the structure of olfactory and, in particular, aesthetic ol-
factory experience? Smell appears to present the perceiver with an im-
mediate sensation of a unified percept. When you inhale a perfume
or drink fine wine, you perceive their qualities as an undifferentiated
synthetic whole at first. This understanding of odor and flavor has led
to the widespread opinion that olfactory percepts do not seem to pos-
sess any clear perceptual structure or cognitively assessable content.
Such an impression, however, only accounts for naive smelling. By
contrast, trained and analytic smelling or tasting attends to the percep-
tual properties. It is an active, not a passive form of perceiving. Here,
perceptual properties are deliberately sought out, discriminated, com-
pared, judged, and linked to previous experiences. From this view, the
naive smeller and the analytic one perceive differently because they
are engaging in different processes. Unlike the untrained perceiver, the
discriminatory abilities of experienced smellers are guided through at-
tention and directed focus, shaped by the yearlong experience of de-
composing odor and flavor notes (a similar argument has been made
for tasting, see Smith, 2007a,b; Todd, 2010).
For this reason, the content of perception is not defined solely
by what is presented immediately to us through the senses. Percep-
tions can be refined. Refined perceptions are governed by a vari-
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and intention. They are further penetrated by cognitive influences
through education, knowledge, imagination, and culture. In particular
aesthetic experience is conceived as constituting such a refinement of
perception by providing a cultivated apprehension of particular fea-
tures of experience and objects. Such cultivation of perception is not
only a capacity of the visual and auditory but also of the gustatory
and olfactory systems. Our perceptions of scent and flavor can be bro-
ken down into different components and temporal sequences, some
of which require refined cognitive access for their evaluation (Ellena,
2012).
To be sure, smell is very difficult to measure and define. Its cogni-
tive dimension is strongly influenced by contextual and subjective fac-
tors such as associations and memories (Barwich, 2014). Moreover,
many biological factors such as genetic differences across individu-
als lead to varying perceptual capacities (Keller & Vosshall, 2008).
Psychophysical measurement differentiates between four different as-
pects of smelling: threshold (i.e., the detection of odors at low con-
centrations); intensity (i.e., the strength of an odor sensation); per-
sistence (i.e., the duration of an odor sensation); hedonic tone (i.e.,
the pleasantness and affect of an odor sensation); and character de-
scriptions (i.e., the perceptual quality of an odor sensation) (Barwich
& Chang, 2015; Hummel & Welge-Luessen, 2006; Wise, Olsson, &
Cain, 2000). For our consideration about olfactory aesthetics, we will
be concerned with odor quality and hedonic tone only.
Conceptualizing odor quality is a daunting task. Odors seem to
come in general classes (e.g., garlicky, burnt, floral, green), yet their
number is almost endless (e.g., violet, iris, lily, etc.). Unlike for the vi-
sual or auditory system, the physical stimulus of smell has not led to
a comprehensive classification yet. However, this is not a result of the
seemingly subjective nature of smells but the physical characteristics
of the olfactory stimulus. Instead of being based on a single, linear pa-
rameter such as wavelength, the molecular basis of smell is non-spatial
but multidimensional (Keller & Vosshall, 2016; Ohloff, Pickenhagen,
& Kraft, 2011).
Nonetheless, perfumers, wine tasters, and other fragrance or flavor
experts have developed a variety of classifications to deal with the in-
herent qualitative complexity of smells. These classifications are of-
ten presented in so-called fragrance or aroma wheels. In comparison,
these wheels can vary both in their constitutive classes and ordering
criteria. That said, they all build on a similar functional premise. Using
mainly vernacular terms, the purpose of fragrance and aroma wheels
is to provide a standard terminology for the communication between
perfume or wine creators, consumers, and retailers.
Influential examples for such wheels are, for example, the wine
aroma wheel by Ann C. Noble or the fragrance wheels by Ulrich
Harder and Michael Edwards. Resting on basic, well-known odor
groups (plus subgroups), these classifications guide the qualitative
characterization of wine or perfume. For example, in Harder's wheel,
we find floral odors divided into three abstract sensory categories,
namely ‘light,’ ‘green,’ and ‘heavy.’ These categories are further sur-
rounded by seventeen more specific notes. Notably, “the circle is
arranged in such a way that related notes are adjacent and blend seam-
lessly with one another (Ohloff et al., 2011, p. 31).” In comparison,
the wheel of Michael Edwards (Fig. 1) addresses a broader range of
qualities, namely ‘floral,’ ‘oriental,’ ‘woody,’ ‘fresh,’ and ‘fougère.’
These classes are also divided into subgroups, such as ‘dry woods,’
or ‘mossy woods.’ An interesting feature of this representation is its
dynamic character: apart from ‘fougère,’ all categories can be rotated
to combine the outer dimensions of odor quality and the inner dimen-
sions of sensual impressions in the classification of a specific odorant.
Fig. 1. Fragrance wheel of Michael Edwards (image by Epaun, 2007): Edward's
wheel was originally designed in 1983 but modified several times since.
Qualitative categorization constitutes a necessary but not sufficient
element in training the aesthetic appraisal of odors or flavors. Catego-
rization is not primarily an aesthetic activity. Regarding the aesthetic
assessment of wines or perfumes, these wheels thus represent only
one dimension. Another important dimension is hedonic tone, which
refers to the affective nature of smells as being pleasant or unpleas-
ant. Current research in olfaction investigates the correlation of odor
qualities and hedonic tone by modeling so-called sensory maps (Zarzo
& Stanton, 2009). Such sensory maps aim at a systematic representa-
tion of odors that correlate some perceptible features of the physical
stimuli with topographically organized activation patterns in the brain
(Fig. 2). The dimensions of hedonicity in these maps are interpreted
along two axes with opposite poles. These poles describe four key ef-
fects: (i) erogenous and anti-erogenous, and (ii) narcotic and stimu-
lating. The arrangement of odors under these criteria does, however,
not always result in clear-cut cases. Often, such classes exhibit a hy-
brid character: “narcotic plus anti-erogenous is calming; anti-eroge-
nous plus stimulating is fresh; stimulating plus erogenous is exalting;
erogenous plus narcotic is sultry (Donna, 2009, p. 28).”
Thus, when we take a look at the content of aesthetic judgments
about perfumes or wine, we must distinguish between different di-
mensions as constituting their aesthetic perception. Resonating with
the above categories of psychophysical measurement, we find similar
levels of perceptual analysis represented in wine and perfume assess-
ments. First, there is the descriptive level of qualitative characteriza-
tion, which we saw in the aforementioned fragrance and flavor wheels.
Then, there also is the evaluative part of the examination. Here, eval-
uations can refer to objective assessments of qualitative differences
(i.e., whether the odor notes in a perfume or wine are well-balanced or
a note is too intense). Yet, they could also express personal preference
(e.g., I might intellectually appreciate the harmony of odor notes in a
particular perfume or wine, but that will not necessarily compel me to
like it). Also, reflecting our verbal and cultural associations, we are of-
ten confronted with a mixture of literal and metaphorical expressions
in aesthetic assessment (Todd, 2010, p. 48). From this perspective,
judgments about aesthetic experience tend to blend analytical with as-
sociative apprehension in perceptual processing.
Let me follow up with some illustrative examples about perfume.
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Fig. 2. Multidimensional sensory odor map (image from Zarzo & Stanton, 2009): Odors are arranged through two axes of opposite pairs (erogenous vs. anti-erogenous, narcotic/
sweet vs. stimulating/bitter). For the identification of reference substances, they first consulted two large odor databases, namely those curated by Boelens-Haring and Thiboud. These
databases comprise a variety of odorants that correlate two data sets, molecular parameters of odorants on the one hand and odor descriptors on the other. The reference materials
these contain were then scaled and compared with Paul Jellinek's influential odor effects diagram (Jellinek, 1997).
duced by the company of Guerlain in 1975):
“The citrus and galbanum in Parure ('Jewelry Set') is bracing and
bitter. Herbal notes of thyme and clary sage soften this bright-
ness and prepare you for the sweet warmth of a jasmine that
shines like the sun within Parure's dry mossy, leather impression.
Soon enough, the 'formal' part of the perfume announces itself:
leather, moss, styrax, and vetiver, with amber and Tolu balsam's
warmth echoing the jasmine. For a moment, there is an interesting
caramel note that recalls Azurée and Miss Balmain, an evanescent
gourmand quality in an otherwise fresh and mossy-dry fragrance.
Parure's balance of citrus, warmth, and mossy-dry-leather is per-
fection.” (Herman, 2013, p. 152)
We encounter several levels in the aesthetic assessment of Parure.
The quote mainly focuses on the temporal structure and the devel-
opment the perfume: starting with a top note (citrus, galbanum, gal-
banum, clary sage), proceeding to the heart note (jasmine), and re-
vealing a base note (leather, vetiver, moss, amber). This elementary
analysis is complemented by reference to the composition of the per-
fume as indicative of its quality (e.g., its balance, but also the inter-
play of complementary elements such as the caramel note in an oth-
erwise fresh fragrance). Furthermore, fragrances with similar qualities
are mentioned to situate the perfume's overall character in a tradition
of similar fragrances. In addition to such a descriptive assessment, we
can find more metaphorical descriptions of perfume, too: “If you've
ever hiked near the mountains, you know what it's like to feel as if
you're in multiple climates at once (Herman, 2013, pp. 74, on Alpona
by Caron from 1939). Such associative characterizations can likewise
reveal aesthetic impressions, in this case of the multiple levels of
a perfume's composition. Sometimes, perfumes are evaluated in the
context changing cultural or historical styles: “A simple, herbal/anisic
chypre that Edmond Roudnitska described at the time as ‘the only
true chypre on the market’ To a modern nose, it might come across a
little too lemony (Herman, 2013, pp. 101, on Eau Fraîche by Christ-
ian Dior from 1953).” Last but not least, many perfumes have a strong
hedonic dimension that permeates their experience: “With the narcotic
sweetness of neroli, ylang-ylang, and jasmine, initially pushed in a
green, fresh direction by its sharp top notes, My Sin quickly drops it
like it's hot in the base notes, with a lascivious and warm civet-led bal-
samic drydown (Herman, 2013, pp. 38, on My Sin by Lanvin from
1924).” – It is worth pointing out that flavor and taste properties in
wine are analyzed in a similar fashion (Smith, 2007a,b; Todd, 2010).
We have now arrived at a perspective on olfactory perception that
reveals its content and structure as being formed by several perceptual
layers and evaluative dimensions. If we understand aesthetic percep-
tion as providing a refined and attentive access to special features of
objects and sophisticated experience, then olfaction certainly admits to
such appreciation. What can we conclude from this understanding of
olfaction for the general debate about aesthetic perception? Through-
out this paper, I combined recent insights from neuroscience with tra-
ditional knowledge in perfumery and wine tasting to integrate olfac-
tion into the philosophical discussion of aesthetics. Here, we discov-
ered two interrelated issues. First, the exclusion of olfaction in aes-
thetic discourse rests on a doctrine of objectivity that was rendered
problematic. This doctrine entails an outdated separation of percep-
tion and cognition that stands in conflict with current understanding
of neural feedback processes in neuroscience. Second, olfaction draws
on a range of top down processes and is not, as previously assumed, a
mere brutish sensation that lacks cognitive load. To the contrary, ac-
cording to olfactory science, a variety of top-down processes such as
expectation, attention and training fundamentally shape not only the
identification of smell qualities but also their hedonic evaluation.
In further consequence, what we must recognize is that the per-
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fixed but leaves sufficient room for contextual evaluation and the in-
dividual acquisition of a differentiated range of tastes. With the excep-
tions of some intrinsically repugnant smells (e.g., cadaverine or ska-
tole), odors can also represent acquired perceptions. As such, any eval-
uation of their content is a matter of exposure, experience, content, and
training. This is not unlike the training in and the detection of styles in
other sensory aesthetics. The important insight to take away from this
is that the contextuality of odor evaluation does not mean that smell
experience is merely subjective. A lot of the variability in smell expe-
rience is a result of contextual cognitive confluences and ascribes to
the deep entrenchment of perception and perceptual judgment in olfac-
tion. As we have seen here, humans have a strong capacity for analytic
odor perception and evaluation, which points to the central cognitive
element that characterizes general aesthetic experience. This element
refers to the refinement of perception in order to recognize, discrimi-
nate, and evaluate the variable qualitative features of things.
3. Part 2: Neuroaesthetics
3.1. Refined perception as a (neural) decision-making process
I now want to elaborate on the model of aesthetic experience as a
refinement of perception and engage with its empirical basis. The most
important insight from the previous analysis on olfaction is that the
processing that gives rise to aesthetic experiences differs substantially
between naïve and trained smellers. This fact is by no means trivial
but, as we come to explore in what follows, indicates a promising in-
tersection of philosophical aesthetics with studies in neuroscience. As
neuroscience sets out to unravel the brain mechanisms that constitute
perceptual and cognitive processes, having also rectified our miscon-
ceptions about olfaction, it is reasonable to consider what it may con-
tribute to the philosophical study of concepts such as aesthetic percep-
tion.
Empirical works in aesthetics already acknowledge that there are
some differences between trained and untrained perceptual experi-
ence. One example for this is the appreciation of quality in artworks.
Here, studies largely focus on a binary scaling of artworks between ex-
perts and laymen (e.g., the absence of craftsmanship versus craftsman-
ship; poor quality versus good quality) (Hekkert & Van Wieringen,
1996). However, what has not been investigated thus far are the phe-
nomenological differences in perceptual content and structure be-
tween naïve and trained perceivers. As argued throughout the previous
sections, the phenomenological structure of refined aesthetic experi-
ence can vary quite significantly from naïve smelling in olfaction.
From a theoretical perspective, the process of refining perceptions
implies the capacity of reshaping our current perceptual constraints.
Such reshaping concerns the reinterpretation of the available percep-
tual options through selective attention. What this means more con-
cretely is that particular stimulus features are initially identified and
classified (as belonging to a kind of perceptual objects) to be fur-
ther discriminated through a comparison with similar elements known
from previous experience and training. This comparison then allows
weighing these elements regarding the standards of their perceptual
class. Such measures can be broadly conceived (e.g., how is X as a
white wine) and also further specified (e.g., how is X as a Riesling, or
how is X as a Riesling from this location or that year). As a result of
such refinement of a perception, aesthetic experiences mirror an iter-
ative cognitive engagement with a perceptual process. In this context,
our anticipations regarding the nature of the stimulus and its features
can enhance or distort the evaluative processing. This model of re
fined processing illustrates that aesthetic perception exceeds an imme-
diate impression of mere liking a thing (though it does not exclude it).
In experimental studies of aesthetics, the elements of such com-
parisons in perceptual refinement have been referred to as “collative
properties” (Berlyne, 1971). A similar, more detailed, description is
given by Walton (1970) in philosophical aesthetics. Aesthetic pro-
cessing of properties in this context refers to three kinds of percep-
tual evaluations, namely standard or stereotypical, variable, and con-
tra-standard features of perceptual elements. So, for example, a Ries-
ling might be evaluated as being ‘dry’ (standard), as having the quali-
ties of ‘apple’ or ‘petrol’ (variable, depending on the grape region and
the wine's age), and as having ‘high alcohol content’ (contra-standard,
e.g., in the French version Riesling D'Alsace).
Modeling the cognitive processing of such comparative evalua-
tions in the refinement of perception is precisely where insights from
neuroscience may complement and further general aesthetic debate in
the near future. In particular studies of decision-making are relevant
in this context. Scientific interest in the neural basis of decision-mak-
ing has been thriving, especially over the past 25 years. It deeply con-
nects research from neuroscience with works in economics, psychol-
ogy, computational science, cognitive science, and philosophy. 2 In
essence, research on decision-making investigates the neural mecha-
nisms of weighing and selecting with respect to the presence and shift-
ing dominance of perceptual cues. Decision-making refers to various
unconscious as well as conscious processes that select between incom-
ing signals based on several, sometimes conflicting decision factors
in relation to a range of appropriate responses (e.g., Gold & Shadlen,
2007; Shadlen & Kiani, 2013).3
My impression of the shared, though implicit, interest between
studies of aesthetic perception and neural decision-making is reflected
in the questions that are driving decision-making research, such as:
How does our brain act and decide that a particular constraint for
weighing and comparing a perceptual element is inadequate, thereby
readjusting the perceptual sensitivities? How can sets of diagnostic
cues (e.g., cross-sensory, verbal labeling, etc.) shift our attention and,
in turn, affect and form our perceptual structure and qualitative expe-
rience (such as in wine tasting)? Decision-making expresses and even
requires a certain flexibility and changeability in perceptual attention
and selectivity.4
4 What, for instance, makes an input strong enough for our brain to act on it? In the
case of olfaction, we are constantly surrounded by hundreds of odorous molecules,
but we rarely are aware of their smell. Slightest concentration changes in our
chemical environment can change such obliviousness immediately, however.
Likewise, you may not wake up from the traffic outside your window, but a
screaming baby will alert you right away. Perceptual processes investigated from
the perspective of decision-making processes thus relate to the selectivity by
which organisms engage with their environment. For some neuroscientists,
decision-making, therefore, even constitutes the foundation for perception and
cognition (Gold & Shadlen, 2007).
3 In this context, decision are generally defined as “a commitment to a proposition
or plan of action based on information and values associated with the possible
outcomes” and the study of decision making in current neuroscience focuses on
“the discovery of neural mechanisms that support accuracy, speed, and confidence
in a decision” (Shadlen & Kiani, 2013).
2 That said, research on decision-making has not been directly linked to any
questions surrounding philosophical aesthetics yet. Notwithstanding, with respect
to the here outlined refinement model of aesthetic perception, I think that it yields
a great potential to further our understanding of perceptual refinement. This claim
is validated not at least by research tendencies in the industry, where an increase
of neuroimaging studies is supposed to shed light on the perceptual cues and
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Refined perception significantly builds on such selective attention
in decision-making processes and, in turn, is deeply context-depen-
dent in its nature (flexibility of diagnostic cues). In refined perception,
we conceived something as aesthetic because we experience it as be-
ing somewhat comparable yet different and preferable to other, similar
enough elements. The inherent potential for the sophistication of our
senses through the flexibility of selective attention, is fundamental to
perception in general and aesthetic perception in particular. What we
experience through aesthetic perception is selective on a signal's com-
bination with other sensory cues, previous experiences, and our capac-
ity to shift attention to particular qualitative features of the perceptual
object.
The upshot is that aesthetic perception represents a cultivation of
preferences regarding specific features of the environment and partic-
ular stimulus features. While you may be unable to perceive certain
features due to lack of training and awareness, a fragrance expert will
easily be able to point you at subtle differences in the composition of a
complex mixture, relating to the harmony and proportions of its ingre-
dients. Therefore, the perception of odors and their aesthetic value is
not a subjective sensation, as it was claimed in pervious philosophical
debate. Smell is objective in the sense that it concerns an evaluation of
salient stimulus features. Objectivity does not imply that smell is not
invariant, as it is subject to observational training, selective attention,
and contextual cues. Moreover, the effects can be studied both with re-
spect to the phenomenological structure of their perceptual experience
as well as their neural correlates.
3.2. Outlook: aesthetic theorizing in the age of neuroscience
In closing, I briefly want to reflect on the implications of consult-
ing neuroscience in philosophical debates on aesthetics. Over the past
two decades, it has become reasonable to wonder whether we must
think differently about aesthetic perception in the time of neuroscien-
tific breakthroughs. A considerable part of my argument for rehabili-
tating the sense of smell from oblivion in philosophical aesthetics was
drawing on recent insights from sensory neuroscience. By extension,
I further interpreted the emphasized refinement of perception through
its neural foundation as a decision-making process.
Such a neuro-centric approach mirrors a current trend in cogni-
tive neuroscience. A recent approach that ventures into the underex-
plored biological basis of aesthetic experience is the emerging field
of “neuroaesthetics.” Neuroaesthetics, a term introduced by Zeki and
Nash (1999), refers to a growing domain in cognitive neuroscience,
where researchers hope to identify and understand the neural basis
of aesthetic perception by looking at brain activation patterns during
the perception of art .5 However, the use of neuroscientific studies in
the analysis of traditionally philosophical concepts is not uncontested.
Critics targeting the idea of modeling aesthetic experience through
neural processes have pointed at the underdeveloped theoretical un-
derstanding of the aesthetic and art in many of these studies (Gopnik,
5 Using imaging and neurophysiological techniques, such as functional magnetic
resonance (fMRI), magnetoencephalography (MEG) and electroencephalography
(EEG), findings have highlighted the strong involvement of sensorimotor areas,
core emotional and reward-related centers in aesthetic experiences (Chatterjee &
Vartanian, 2014; Chatterjee, 2011, 2013; Cinzia & Vittorio, 2009).
2012).6 A central concern of philosophers here is that aesthetic expe-
riences are considered to have a cognitive dimension that is not re-
ducible to neural processing. This is a valid concern, but there is an-
other way to envisage neuroaesthetics.
Neuroscience does not necessarily entail reductionism in the sense
that all cognitive processes can be mapped neatly onto a neural corre-
late. Rather than explain away abstract concepts or phenomenological
experiences, insights from neuroscience can enhance theoretical con-
ception of ourselves as being capable of phenomena such as aesthetic
perception. Some of the neural mechanisms that facilitate perceptual
and cognitive processing point to features that distinguish different
kinds of experiences. Therefore, I view neuroscience not as a tool to
diminish the complexity of concepts such as aesthetic perception but,
to the contrary, as a tool that allows us to dig deeper into its charac-
teristics and specifics. Noticeably, the implementation of neuroscience
does not force a specific philosophical position but its insights into the
principles of higher brain organization can resonate with several philo-
sophical ideas about aesthetic perception in contemporary discourse.
When we compare the positions in the philosophical debate with stud-
ies in neuroaesthetics in broad brushstrokes, we can find sufficient and
instructive correspondences across different models of aesthetics ex-
perience to conceive of fruitful cross-links between the two different
disciplinary approaches (Fig. 3).
In light of this, neuroaesthetics opens up a brand new domain of in-
quiry that has yet to define its concrete aims and principles. The shared
aim, then, should be to formulate a naturalistic framework, which inte-
grates the scientific expertise of sensory and cognitive processes with
insight from the humanities about the contents and contexts of aes-
thetic experiences and interactions with artifacts.7 On this account,
neuroaesthetics presents us with an excellent opportunity to make
philosophical ideas relevant to ongoing experimental practice and,
vice versa, using its findings to further the discussion of concepts in
traditional aesthetic studies. The integration of smell into aesthetic de-
bate through the integration of olfactory neuroscience with olfactory
craftsmanship presented an example in this context.
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Fig. 3. Matrix of the positions concerning the relation of external and internal conditions of aesthetic experience: We can classify the different positions on aesthetic expe-
rience into internalist and externalist approaches, depending on where they locate the source of such experience. As we have seen earlier, in most philosophical theories, aesthetic
experience is objective in the sense that it either grounds in distinct features of the perceived objects, such as in formalist theories of art, or it evokes experiences of a particular
kind of structure or content, such as in pragmatist views like Dewey (Carroll, 2001). In parallel with objective externalist views, we find studies in neuroaesthetics that focus on the
recognition and appraisal of abstract design to understand the cognitive values of aesthetic objects (Ramachandran & Hirstein, 1999). Complementary to objective internalist views,
neuroscientists have tried modeling the sensory processes that give rise to particular perceptual effects caused by visual art (Livingstone, 2002). Meanwhile, others scholars were
developing functionalist models of aesthetic experience. These models aimed to explain how the phenomenon of aesthetic experience evolved as part of human cognition and culture.
In the humanities, attention was first directed at the social and institutional context as shaping the beliefs about the aesthetic values of art objects (e.g., the institutional theory of art
by Dickie (1974)). Later, scholars also started looking at the aesthetic appreciation of everyday objects and events, thereby framing art as being only a special case in a wider realm
of aesthetic experiences (Mandoki, 2007; Saito, 2015). Studies of ordinary aesthetics investigate aesthetic perception as a process that is grounded in a wider context of evolutionary
and social structures (Mandoki, 2015). Equivalents in empirical aesthetics, for example, analyze the regularities of facial and other physical features that are considered attractive
in a society. Unfortunately, these results are sometimes can be claimed prematurely as providing support for models in evolutionary psychology (Chatterjee, 2013, p. Ch. 3). A
third understanding of aesthetics is given in performative ideas about aesthetics that intentionally blend internal and external factors. Here, aesthetic experience is seen as expressing
individual, non-instrumental reasoning in contrast with socially defined rationality and norms. Examples for this position can be found in Adorno's ideas about aesthetics (Carroll,
2001). From a scientific perspective, such a definition of aesthetics is naturally harder to study in controlled experimental settings. Nonetheless, we find corresponding views as
anecdotal reports of artistic creativity on brain-damaged patients (Chatterjee, 2011).
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